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idend payouts in various disclosure regimes. Poorly-protected creditors do not restrict the
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 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, pp. 737) define corporate governance as ‘‘the ways in which suppliers of finance to corpora-
tions assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”. Investors can attempt to safeguard their investment by
monitoring the firms they invest in. However, effective monitoring is part influenced by the accounting standards which
determine the amount and accuracy of corporate disclosures. Where corporations provide abundant, accurate and timely
disclosures, agency costs of debt and equity are low (see Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998). In contrast, where disclosure envi-
ronments are opaque, agency costs arise between corporate insiders and outsiders (see Atanasov et al., 2007).
Creditors modify loan contracts to account for poor enforceability of contracts, weak creditor rights, and information
asymmetry. Bae and Goyal (2009) show that banks reduce the loan amount, decrease loan maturity, and increase the cost
of debt capital where loan contract violations are poorly enforced. In this paper we examine whether creditors take steps
beyond modifying the loan contract and examine if and to what extent they shape corporate dividend payout policies in var-
ious disclosure regimes. Brockman and Unlu (2009) explore the relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights.
Creditors permit large dividend payouts where their legal rights are strong, yet poorly-protected creditors restrict dividend
payouts (the substitution hypothesis). Brockman and Unlu (2011) show that the dividend-disclosure relationship is neither
positive (the agency ‘‘outcome” model says the dividend-disclosure relationship is positive) nor negative (the agency
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poor country-level disclosure standards with ‘‘reputation capital”, which is achieved by establishing a history of paying large
dividends over time to ‘‘convince shareholders that it will invest properly and for their benefit” (see Claessens and Yurtoglu,
2013, pp. 21; Gan et al., 2014). In transparent regimes where outsiders can better observe managerial actions and corporate
profitability, dividend payouts are an outcome of strong disclosure standards. Where disclosure standards are neither strong
nor weak, dividend payouts are much lower, a result which Brockman and Unlu (2011) do not try to explain.1
In this paper we seek to provide the answers to three questions which arise in light of the collective findings of Brockman
and Unlu (2009, 2011). First, if growth firms in opaque disclosure regimes use large dividend payouts to build trust with
outside investors; will they still be able to do so given weak creditor rights? In other words, does the disclosure standards
version of the agency substitution model of dividends hold under weak creditor rights?2 To the best of our knowledge, no
study to-date has conclusively tested either version (legal rights or accounting standards) of the agency substitution models
of dividends inclusive of the agency costs of debt. Studies which do find a negative dividend–shareholder rights relationship
are very often single-country dividend-corporate governance studies (see Jiraporn and Ning, 2006; Chae et al., 2009). These
studies make it impossible to test the creditor rights inclusive agency substitution model of dividends, as creditor rights are
constant within countries.3 In an international multi-country setting where creditor rights vary across countries, Brockman
and Unlu (2011) present strong evidence in favour of the disclosure standards version of the substitution model, which makes
tests of this model inclusive of the agency costs of debt possible.
Second, we examine if the disclosure standards version of the outcome model of dividends holds under weak creditor
rights? Byrne and O’Connor (2012) and Shao et al. (2013) show that the shareholder rights version of the outcome model
of dividends is most effective under strong shareholder and strong creditor rights; dividend payouts are reduced where
shareholder rights are strong (the shareholder rights outcome model of dividends), yet creditor rights weak (the creditor
rights substitution model of dividends). Tests of the disclosure standards version of the outcome model of dividends inclu-
sive of the agency costs of debt have yet to be performed.
Finally, we test the dividend-creditor rights relationship in intermediate disclosure regimes to test whether the low div-
idend payouts which we observe in intermediate regimes are caused by the inclusion of firms from Canada and the U.S.,
where dividend payouts are low, but crucially, creditor rights weak.
We argue that the answer to the first question is not obvious since there are valid reasons why creditors may not restrict
dividend payouts in opaque disclosure regimes. The bonding costs borne by reputation-building firms may be sufficiently
large to offset the agency costs of debt associated with poor creditor rights and/or weak disclosure standards and build trust
with creditors. Large stable dividend payouts paid over time can built trust with creditors and reduce the agency costs of
debt if they; first, reduce the agency costs of free cash flow and the risk of overinvestment which can reduce creditors’ claims
on firm assets (see Jensen, 1986); second, the issue of new shares expose firms to the additional scrutiny of capital markets
(see Easterbrook, 1984); and third, if reputation building increases the market value of the firm and in turn the market value
of the firm’s debt holdings (see Handjinicolaou and Kalay, 1984). Therefore in opaque regimes creditors may view large div-
idend payouts as beneficial to their own needs and may not restrict dividends payouts given weak creditor rights.
In relation to the second question, we hypothesize that poorly-protected creditors may not place large restrictions on div-
idend payouts in transparent regimes as they do in strong shareholder rights regimes. This is because they may view strong
disclosure laws as a viable substitute for weak creditor rights. Strong shareholder rights likely benefit shareholders alone, yet
strong disclosure laws reduce the agency costs of debt and equity.4 Therefore, even given weak legal rights, creditors may not
restrict dividend payouts to reduce agency costs of debt since abundant disclosures may already serve to do so. In this regard,
strong disclosure laws may moderate the dividend–creditor rights relationship and reduce the need for creditors to use divi-
dend payouts to substitute for weak creditor rights.
Finally, the agency models of dividends say that dividend payouts should either increase (the outcomemodel) or decrease
(the substitution model) as disclosure quality improves, resulting in dividend payouts that are lowest in either weak (out-
come model) or strong (substitution model) disclosure regimes, respectively. These models, which have yet to consider the
strength of creditor rights, offer no reason for why dividend payouts are actually lowest in intermediate disclosure regimes.
The asymmetric dividend payout models can offer no explanation either. The theoretical work of Miller and Rock (1985) and
others say that dividend payouts have information content under the assumption of an information asymmetry between
insiders and outsiders. These models predict that dividend payouts should be lowest in transparent regimes because the
information content of dividend payouts is at its lowest here because of the abundant disclosures which enrich the informa-
tion environment (see Howe and Lin, 1992; Li and Zhao, 2008). Therefore, neither the asymmetric or agency models of div-
idends can explain why dividend payouts are lowest in intermediate disclosure regimes. In this paper we consider an1 Studies prior to Brockman and Unlu (2011), and beginning with La Porta et al. (2000), test the outcome and substitution agency models of dividends by
exploring the relationship between dividend payouts and the strength of shareholder rights (legal rights).
2 The idea that firms can build capital market reputation using dividend payout is not new. Campbell and Turner (2011) find evidence to support the agency
substitution model of dividends in Victorian Britain. Agarwal (2013) finds support in favour of the outcome model in early 1900s United States.
3 Another problem with these single country studies is that their findings appear to be influenced by the corporate governance measured used. Jiraporn and
Ning (2006) and Chae et al. (2009) find support in favour of the substitution model. Also using U.S. firms, but different corporate governance measures, Jiraporn
et al. (2011) find support in favour of the outcome model of dividends.
4 Klock et al. (2005) and Cremers et al. (2007) present for evidence from the U.S. which suggests that bondholders frown upon strong shareholder rights.
Botosan (1997) and Sengupta (1998) show that the cost of debt and equity capital is inversely related to disclosure standards.
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are caused by the inclusion of firms from Canada and the U.S., where dividend payouts are low, but crucially, creditor rights
weak.
We seek to answer these three questions using a sample of 17,544 firms from 28 countries. Our tests are possible because
there is variation in creditor rights and disclosure standards in each disclosure and creditor rights regime, respectively. We
use Djankov et al.’s (2007) creditor right index and the CIFAR (1995) disclosure index to capture the strength of creditor
rights and accounting standards, respectively. We divide our sample of firms into one of three disclosure regimes, namely,
high, medium, and low, and proceed to estimate the dividend-creditor rights relationship in each regime. A priori, if poorly-
protected creditors restrict dividend payouts, then we should observe a pronounced positive dividend payout-creditor rights
relationship. If they either do not or place few restrictions on dividend payouts, then we should observe that the dividend-
creditor rights relationship is much less pronounced, and possibly even negative.
Cho et al. (2014, pg. 40) observe that the ‘‘literature on the role of creditor protection in corporate financing is in its
infancy”. We believe our findings advance this literature in a number of important respects. First, we find that in opaque
regimes dividend payouts are larger, not smaller, given weak creditor rights, resulting in a negative dividend-creditor rights
relationship. For whatever reasons, poorly-protected creditors allow firms to pay large dividends. The result is that the dis-
closure standards version of the substitution model of dividends holds regardless of the strength of creditor rights. Second,
the disclosure standards version of the outcome model of dividends is as effective under weak as it is under strong creditor
rights; dividends remain the largest in transparent regimes regardless of the strength of creditor rights. The result is a pos-
itive, yet moderate dividend-creditor rights relationship in high disclosure regimes. Rich disclosures appear to moderate the
dividend-creditor rights relationship. Byrne and O’Connor (2012) and Shao et al. (2013) find that dividend payouts are large
under strong creditor and shareholder rights, yet are much reduced given weak creditor rights. The findings from this paper,
together with those of Byrne and O’Connor (2012) and Shao et al. (2013), suggest that creditors view strong disclosure stan-
dards, but not strong shareholder rights, as beneficial to their own interests. Third, and in line with our prior expectations, it
is only in intermediate disclosure regimes where poorly-protected creditors place large restrictions on dividend payouts. The
substitution model of dividends espoused by Brockman and Unlu (2009) is most evident in intermediate disclosure regimes
since it is here that we observe the strongest dividend-creditor rights relationship. Where creditor rights are strong, dividend
payouts in intermediate disclosure regimes are larger than they are under weak creditor rights.
Finally, the dividend-creditor rights relationships have important implications for the relationship between dividends
and disclosure quality. Our findings show that the ‘‘u-shaped” dividend payout-disclosure relationship manifests in weak
creditor rights regimes alone. Where creditor rights are strong, the dividend payout is an outcome of strong disclosure stan-
dards; we observe a positive monotonic relationship between dividend payouts and disclosure standards. However, dividend
payouts remain sufficiently large in opaque regimes, so that the agency substitution model continues to hold. Therefore,
under both strong and weak creditor rights, the disclosure standards versions of the outcome and substitution models of
dividends hold.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the sample and variables used in the study.
Section 3 analyses our findings, while Section 4 concludes.2. Data and variable descriptions
We collect firm-level data from Worldscope over the period from 1996 to 2007. Brockman and Unlu (2011) use the same
sampling period. Our sample of firms consists of 17,544 firms from 28 countries. We arrive at this final sample after elim-
inating all firms trading in socialist countries i.e., China, Poland, and Hungary, firms trading in Luxembourg, and firms from
countries with mandatory dividend policies i.e., Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, and Venezuela. We exclude all firms from the
financial and utility industries using the general industry classification codes fromWorldscope, and all firm-years with miss-
ing or abnormal data i.e. firms with negative net income (earnings), negative total assets, and negative cash flow. To be
included in our final sample we require all firms to have at least three years of financial data.
Our two main variables of interest are country-level measures of creditor rights and accounting/disclosure standards. We
source creditor rights from Djankov et al. (2007) and use values for the year 2002.5 The creditor rights measure is constructed
by summing four dummy variables. These are; ‘‘no automatic stay on assets”, which is 1 if there is no automatic stay on assets;
‘‘secured first” which is 1 if secured creditors are given priority during the bankruptcy process; ‘‘restrict reorganization” which is
1 if management cannot file for reorganization unilaterally, and ‘‘management no stay” equals 1 if either creditors or the courts
have the option to change the incumbent management team during bankruptcy proceedings. Creditor rights ranges from zero to
four with higher values representing greater levels of legal creditor protection. We use the CIFAR (1995) country-level disclo-
sure index which we source from Hope et al. (2007). This disclosure index is formed by examining and rating companies’ annual
reports for their inclusion and exclusion of 85 items and ranges from 0 to 100 with 100 being the highest standard.
Creditor rights and disclosure standards are reported for each country in Table 1. Legal protection of creditors is partic-
ularly strong in Hong Kong and New Zealand, but much less so in France, and Mexico. Country-level disclosure ranges from a
low of 58 in Turkey to a high of 85 in the United Kingdom. Crucial to our analysis is that there is variation in the strength of5 We find that our main findings remain qualitatively unchanged when we use creditor rights from different years in our regressions.
Table 1
Sample description. This table reports the final sample by country. Average dividend payout is reported for each country. Dividend payout is dividends-to-cash
flow (Div-CF), dividends-to-earnings (Div-E), dividends-to-assets (Div-A), and dividends-to-net sales (Div-S), as indicated. Payout data is sourced from
Worldscope. Creditor rights are an index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta et al. (2000), and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong
creditor rights). Disclosure is a country-level accounting disclosure score assigned by Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). It ranges
from 0 to 100, where higher values correspond to more disclosures. Rank denotes high, medium, or low disclosure. We use uncertainty avoidance (UA) to
capture cultural influences on dividend payout. DTA is dividend tax advantage, SMD is stock market development, ‘‘Div Prem” is dividend premium, and Rev
ADR is the (revised) anti-director rights index. All country-level variables are defined in Appendix A.
Sample Dividend payout measures Creditor
rights
Disclosure Culture Additional country-level variables
# Obs #
Firms
Div-
CF
Div-
E
Div-
A
Div-S Score Rank UA DTA SMD Div
prem
Rev
ADR
Labor
rights
Argentina 324 47 0.07 0.12 0.015 0.013 1 68 Low 86 1.000 38.58 1.24 2 0.344
Australia 4486 778 0.19 0.28 0.021 0.017 3 80 High 51 0.837 110.06 0.95 4 0.352
Austria 406 54 0.13 0.28 0.014 0.013 3 62 Low 70 0.750 23.30 0.79 2.5 0.501
Belgium 566 81 0.12 0.25 0.017 0.015 2 68 Low 94 0.850 68.27 0.95 3.0 0.513
Canada 5286 828 0.05 0.08 0.010 0.006 1 75 Medium 48 0.791 107.40 0.81 4 0.262
Denmark 838 101 0.12 0.21 0.013 0.010 3 75 Medium 23 0.639 57.90 0.90 4 0.573
Finland 563 88 0.23 0.39 0.027 0.020 1 83 High 59 1.078 130.08 1.06 3.5 0.737
France 3957 590 0.12 0.22 0.012 0.011 0 78 High 86 0.657 79.47 0.99 3.5 0.744
Germany 4054 595 0.11 0.22 0.013 0.010 3 67 Low 65 0.728 47.11 1.07 3.5 0.702
Hong Kong 4988 739 0.15 0.20 0.017 0.016 4 73 Medium 29 1.000 339.12 0.83 5 0.170
India 3597 510 0.16 0.23 0.020 0.019 2 61 Low 40 0.744 47.40 1.49 5 0.443
Ireland 394 46 0.14 0.19 0.012 0.011 1 81 High 35 0.611 59.74 0.75 5 0.343
Italy 1259 176 0.12 0.26 0.013 0.015 2 66 Low 75 0.873 44.62 1.07 2 0.650
Japan 24,276 3333 0.12 0.26 0.010 0.007 1 71 Low 92 0.580 78.06 0.92 4.5 0.164
Korea 5031 783 0.08 0.16 0.010 0.008 3 68 Low 85 0.690 55.46 0.82 4.5 0.446
Malaysia 4846 748 0.13 0.20 0.012 0.015 3 79 High 36 1.000 141.56 0.96 5 0.189
Mexico 713 96 0.08 0.14 0.011 0.011 0 71 Low 82 1.000 23.41 1.24 3 0.594
Netherlands 1141 136 0.18 0.30 0.016 0.011 3 74 Medium 53 0.700 113.96 0.82 2.5 0.726
Norway 799 120 0.11 0.18 0.014 0.013 2 75 Medium 50 1.075 44.73 0.89 3.5 0.685
New Zealand 479 72 0.32 0.48 0.039 0.028 4 85 High 49 1.009 39.54 1.07 4 0.161
Singapore 3223 516 0.17 0.24 0.016 0.016 3 79 High 8 0.971 185.63 0.94 5 0.312
Spain 795 101 0.16 0.28 0.021 0.018 2 72 Medium 86 0.851 71.37 0.94 5 0.745
Sweden 1491 239 0.17 0.24 0.019 0.014 1 83 High 29 0.757 104.83 0.87 3.5 0.741
Switzerland 1454 174 0.13 0.24 0.014 0.014 1 80 High 58 0.585 229.64 1.04 3 0.452
Thailand 2535 347 0.18 0.28 0.023 0.020 2 66 Low 64 1.029 51.56 0.99 4 0.410
Turkey 920 165 0.11 0.19 0.016 0.012 2 58 Low 85 0.617 22.40 1.13 3 0.403
Utd Kingdom 9702 1369 0.16 0.25 0.018 0.015 4 85 High 35 0.857 141.99 0.82 5 0.282
United States 36,726 4712 0.04 0.06 0.005 0.004 1 76 Medium 46 0.703 135.07 0.85 3 0.218
124,849 17,544
J. Byrne, T. O’Connor / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 49 (2017) 154–172 157creditor rights within each disclosure regime. If we classify three disclosure regimes as follows: low disclosure with disclo-
sure scores ranging from 58 to 71, medium disclosure (72 to 76), and high disclosure (78 and above), creditor rights range
from 0 to 4, 1 to 4, and 0 to 3, in each of these regimes, respectively.
We use five dividend payout ratios; dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-earnings, dividends-to-assets, dividends-to-
sales, and dividend-payer. Dividend-payer equals 1 if the firm pays a dividend in year t and zero otherwise. Dividends vary
across countries. They are large in New Zealand and Finland, yet much smaller in the United States and Canada. Table 1 also
reports the number of firm-years and the number of firms by country. The United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom
contribute the largest number of firms which is common in these types of studies.3. Empirical analysis
In this section we first examine the relationship between dividend payout, creditor rights, and disclosure quality. Then
having confirmed the findings from Brockman and Unlu (2009, 2011), we proceed to explore the dividend-creditor rights
relationship in low, medium, and high disclosure regimes, and the dividend-disclosure relationship by strength of creditor
rights regimes, respectively. We begin by estimating Eq. (1) using pooled ordinary least squares:DIV PAYOUTit ¼ a1 þ a2CREDITORit þ a3DISCLOSUREit þ a4DISCLOSURE2it þ a5CULTUREit þ a6DIV
 PREMIUMit þ bXit þ Yeart þ Industryi þ eit ð1ÞLike Brockman and Unlu (2011), in Eq. (1) we include disclosure together with its square (disclosure2). The inclusion of
the disclosure-square term by Brockman and Unlu (2011) appears not to be motivated by theory, but rather by the existence
of a ‘‘u-shaped” relationship between dividend payout and disclosure quality which is evident from the summary measures
which they present in their paper. Eq. (1) is estimated using dividends-to-cash flow and dividends-to-earnings, as indicated.
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include a proxy for the dividend premium which captures investor’s appetite for dividend paying stocks.7 Each regression also
includes a single country-level culture measure, namely uncertainty avoidance which we expect to be negatively related to div-
idend payout (see Hofstede, 1980, 2001).8 Time and industry dummies are included but not reported. In all regressions, the
standard errors are clustered by firm (see Petersen, 2009).9
Table 2 presents our coefficient estimates. Here we present three separate regressions. First, we explore the relationship
between dividend payout and creditor rights alone. Next, we replace creditor rights with disclosure and disclosure-squared.
In the third regression, creditor rights, disclosure, disclosure-squared are included simultaneously along with a full set of
firm- and country-level controls, industry and time dummies. In all three regressions, the estimated coefficients on the cred-
itor rights variable are positive and significant coefficient. They range from 0.028⁄⁄⁄ to 0.031⁄⁄⁄ using dividends-to-cash flow
and 0.031⁄⁄⁄ to 0.046⁄⁄⁄ using dividends-to-earnings, and confirm the (creditor) substitution hypothesis of Brockman and
Unlu (2009).
Brockman and Unlu (2011) find that the dividend-disclosure relationship is ‘‘u-shaped”. We confirm that finding here. The
estimated coefficient for disclosure is negative (0.086⁄⁄⁄ and 0.021⁄⁄⁄ using dividends-to-cash flow) and positive on the
disclosure-squared variable (0.001⁄⁄⁄ and 0.001⁄⁄⁄) indicating that large dividends are paid in the most opaque and transpar-
ent regimes. Dividend payouts are much lower in intermediate disclosure regimes, a finding which we attempt to explain in
the next section.
In the bottom rows of Table 2 we replace disclosure and disclosure-squared with a series of dummy variables which cap-
ture low (reference-dummy), medium, and high disclosure regimes, respectively.10 When we use these disclosure dummy
variables the same ‘‘u-shaped” relationship between dividend payout and disclosure standards emerges. The coefficient esti-
mates on the ‘‘Medium disclosure” dummy are always statistically negative. In contrast, the coefficient estimates on the ‘‘High
disclosure” dummy is positive and statistically significant which suggests that dividend payouts are largest in the most-
transparent regimes.11
With respect to the firm-level control variables, all are statistically significant and of the expected sign. Large, profitable
firms, with low leverage and low growth opportunities pay large dividends. The coefficient estimates for dividend pre-
mium are positive, as expected. We do not find that dividend payout is negatively related to uncertainty avoidance as
others do.123.1. Summary measures
In this section we take a first look at how creditors influence corporate dividend payouts in the different disclosure
regimes. Consider Fig. 1. The top panel presents the average dividend payout ratio in each disclosure regime where creditor
rights are weak and strong. The bottom panel presents each disclosure regime separately, and outlines the average dividend
payout in each regime also by strength of creditor rights. Creditor rights are deemed weak one if the creditor right score is at
or below the sample median of 2.
In low disclosure regimes average dividend payouts are actually larger, not smaller, where creditor rights are weak. Aver-
age dividends-to-cash flow is 12% and 9% under weak and strong creditor rights, respectively. These summary payout mea-
sures suggest that creditors do not restrict firms in opaque regimes from using large dividends to build trust with outside
investors.
Dividends payouts are larger, but only marginally so, in transparent regimes where creditor rights are strong. The average
dividend paid is 25% of earnings where creditor rights strong and 24% where creditor rights are weak. Poorly-protected cred-
itors place fewer restrictions on dividend payouts in transparent disclosure regimes than they do where shareholder rights
are strong (see Byrne and O’Connor, 2012; Shao et al., 2013). As a result, dividend payouts are always larger in transparent
regimes, irrespective of the strength of creditor rights.
Finally, poorly-creditors place the largest restrictions on dividend payouts in intermediate disclosure regimes; the aver-
age firm pays out 22% of its earnings where creditor rights are strong, yet only 7% where creditor rights are weak. These sum-
mary measures lend support to our contention that the low dividend payouts which we observe in intermediate disclosure
regimes are the result of poorly-protected creditors placing large restrictions on dividend payouts in these regimes.6 We use log assets to proxy for firm size in all dividend regressions where dividends to earnings or dividends to cashflow are the dependent variables. Where
we use dividends to assets (sales), we use sales (assets) as the firm size proxy.
7 The dividend premium is measured on an annual basis for each country and is computed as the ratio of the average market-to-book ratio of dividend paying
firms to the average market-to-book ratio of non-paying firms. We expect the coefficient for dividend premium to be positive (see Baker and Wurgler, 2004).
8 Our findings remain qualitatively the same if we include other culture measures e.g., individualism.
9 A detailed description of each of these firm- and country-level control variables is provided in Appendix A.
10 The ‘‘low disclosure” dummy includes firms from countries whose disclosure scores are less than 71; ‘‘medium disclosure” uses disclosure scores between
72 and 76, and ‘‘high disclosure” includes all firms from countries with a disclosure score of 78 and over. We classify the disclosure regimes as we do because it
results in us to having roughly the same number of countries in each disclosure regime (11 in the low disclosure regime, 7 in the middle, and 10 in the high
regime), and secondly, have sufficient variation in creditor rights within each disclosure regime.
11 Along similar lines, Masters et al. (2016) show that contrary to conventional wisdom, financially constrained firms pay dividends to increase external
financing capacity since larger dividends reduce the costs associated with raising equity in a seasoned offering.
12 Bae et al. (2012) and Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) show that low uncertainty avoidance is significantly associated with higher dividend payouts.
Table 2
Dividend payout, creditor rights and disclosure quality. This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares regressions with t-stats
adjusted for clustering at the firm level presented underneath in parenthesis. The sample period is 1996–2007. The dependent variable is either dividends-to-
cash flow or dividends-to-earnings, as indicated. Creditor rights are an index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta et al. (2000), and ranges from 0
(weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). Creditor rights data is sourced from Djankov et al. (2007). Disclosure is a country-level accounting disclosure
score assigned by Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). It ranges from 0 to 100, where higher values correspond to more disclosures.
In the top panel, ‘‘Disclosure” and ‘‘Disclosure2” are included in each regression. In the bottom panel, we create separate dummy variables for each disclosure
regime, where the reference group is the ‘‘Low disclosure” regime. Uncertainty avoidance measures culture and is sourced from Hofstede (2001). All other
variables are defined in the main text and summarized in Appendix A. A full set of year and industry fixed effects are included but not reported, and ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄, and
⁄ denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable is
Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends-to-earnings
Creditor rights 0.028⁄⁄⁄ 0.031⁄⁄⁄ 0.031⁄⁄⁄ 0.046⁄⁄⁄
(29.20) (26.19) (22.73) (28.36)
Disclosure 0.086⁄⁄⁄ 0.021⁄⁄⁄ 0.112⁄⁄⁄ 0.034⁄⁄⁄
(24.90) (4.99) (22.06) (5.73)
Disclosure2 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.001⁄⁄⁄
(25.00) (5.63) (21.65) (6.55)
Size 0.013⁄⁄⁄ 0.025⁄⁄⁄
(26.99) (36.84)
Growth 0.016⁄⁄⁄ 0.020⁄⁄⁄
(15.11) (13.82)
Leverage 0.078⁄⁄⁄ 0.089⁄⁄⁄
(27.91) (20.92)
Profitability 0.031⁄⁄⁄ 0.027⁄⁄⁄
(17.43) (11.52)
Tobin’s q 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.001
(9.43) (0.41)
Uncertainty avoidance 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.002⁄⁄⁄
(14.59) (30.79)
Dividend premium 0.104⁄⁄⁄ 0.157⁄⁄⁄
(17.15) (17.72)
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
# firm-year observations 124,849 124,849 124,849 124,849 124,849 124,849
R-squared 0.053 0.040 0.147 0.032 0.030 0.172
Medium disclosure dummy 0.061⁄⁄⁄ 0.041⁄⁄⁄ 0.150⁄⁄⁄ 0.086⁄⁄⁄
(30.82) (8.29) (48.62) (12.48)
High disclosure dummy 0.042⁄⁄⁄ 0.032⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄ 0.034⁄⁄⁄
(15.01) (7.60) (1.85) (5.68)
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included
Controls Included Included Included Included
Average div in low disclosure 0.12 0.24
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rights relationships in each, and also different dividend–disclosure relationships in weak and strong creditor rights regimes,
respectively. The dividend–creditor rights relationship is positive in intermediate and high disclosure regimes, yet dividends
are much more sensitive to creditor rights in the former. The dividend–creditor rights relationship is negative in low disclo-
sure regimes. In opaque disclosure regimes, creditors do not restrict dividend payouts given weak legal standing. Rather, div-
idend payouts are larger under weak creditor rights giving rise to a negative dividend–creditor rights relationship.
The dividend–disclosure relationship is ‘‘u-shaped” but only under weak creditor rights; dividends are large in opaque
and transparent regimes, yet much lower in intermediate disclosure regimes. Where creditor rights are strong the divi-
dend–disclosure relationship is positive as dividend payouts increase with disclosure standards. Where creditor rights are
strong, dividend payouts are much larger in intermediate disclosure regimes. Finally, dividend payouts are the largest in high
disclosure regimes where creditor rights are strong.
In the next section we examine if these same relations persist once we control for firm- and country-level determinants of
corporate dividend payouts.
3.2. The ‘‘dividend payout–creditor rights” relation in each disclosure regime
In Table 3 we estimate the dividend–creditor rights relationship in each disclosure regime. The top panel uses the creditor
rights index. The bottom panel uses a low creditor rights dummy which is one if the country-level creditor right score is at or
below the sample median of 2. The analysis presented in Table 3 largely confirms what we found in Fig. 1. First, the divi-
dend–creditor rights relationship is positive in high and intermediate disclosure regimes, yet the relationship is much more
pronounced in intermediate disclosure regimes. For example, using dividends-to-cash flow the coefficient estimate on the
Fig. 1. Dividend payout, disclosure standards and the strength of creditor rights.
160 J. Byrne, T. O’Connor / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 49 (2017) 154–172
Table 3
Dividend payout and creditor rights by disclosure quality. This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares regressions with t-stats
adjusted for clustering at the firm level presented underneath in parenthesis. Separate regressions are estimated by level of disclosure quality. Disclosure is a
country-level accounting disclosure score assigned by Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The sample period is 1996–2007. The
dependent variable is either dividends-to-cash flow or dividends-to-earnings, as indicated. Creditor rights are an index aggregating creditor rights, following La
Porta et al. (2000), and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). Creditor rights data is sourced from Djankov et al. (2007). In the top
panel, the creditor rights index is employed to measure creditor rights. In the bottom panel, the creditor rights index is replaced with a ‘‘Low creditor rights
dummy” variable which is one if creditor rights are less than or equal to the sample median (2) and zero otherwise. Uncertainty avoidance is a country-level
culture measure from Hofstede (2001). All other variables are defined in the main text and summarized in Appendix A. A full set of year and industry fixed
effects are included but not reported, and ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄, and ⁄ denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable is
Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends-to-earnings
Disclosure levels
High Medium Low High Medium Low
Creditor rights 0.018⁄⁄⁄ 0.051⁄⁄⁄ 0.020⁄⁄⁄ 0.028⁄⁄⁄ 0.069⁄⁄⁄ 0.034⁄⁄⁄
(7.84) (22.00) (11.05) (8.90) (22.25) (11.03)
Size 0.025⁄⁄⁄ 0.014⁄⁄⁄ 0.002⁄⁄⁄ 0.042⁄⁄⁄ 0.024⁄⁄⁄ 0.015⁄⁄⁄
(23.08) (21.59) (2.98) (27.84) (26.39) (12.05)
Growth 0.025⁄⁄⁄ 0.011⁄⁄⁄ 0.033⁄⁄⁄ 0.027⁄⁄⁄ 0.017⁄⁄⁄ 0.030⁄⁄⁄
(10.20) (10.79) (9.87) (8.44) (12.31) (6.18)
Leverage 0.123⁄⁄⁄ 0.021⁄⁄⁄ 0.179⁄⁄⁄ 0.131⁄⁄⁄ 0.019⁄⁄⁄ 0.245⁄⁄⁄
(14.60) (7.91) (37.06) (11.42) (4.72) (28.12)
Profitability 0.101⁄⁄⁄ 0.004⁄⁄⁄ 0.156⁄⁄⁄ 0.127⁄⁄⁄ 0.001 0.174⁄⁄⁄
(17.23) (2.94) (13.89) (16.76) (0.16) (12.49)
Tobin’s q 0.019⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄ 0.014⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.021⁄⁄⁄
(9.80) (7.11) (2.38) (5.67) (3.79) (8.09)
Uncertainty avoidance 0.001 0.002⁄⁄⁄ 0.002⁄⁄⁄ 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.003⁄⁄⁄ 0.002⁄⁄⁄
(0.38) (6.06) (14.23) (3.04) (8.14) (9.51)
Dividend premium 0.087⁄⁄⁄ 0.011 0.057⁄⁄⁄ 0.114⁄⁄⁄ 0.022 0.108⁄⁄⁄
(5.36) (0.81) (6.99) (5.48) (1.20) (8.02)
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
# firm-year observations 30,595 50,573 43,681 30,595 50,573 43,681
R-squared 0.178 0.198 0.148 0.189 0.203 0.104
Low creditor rights dummy 0.059⁄⁄⁄ 0.145⁄⁄⁄ 0.046⁄⁄⁄ 0.079⁄⁄⁄ 0.204⁄⁄⁄ 0.074⁄⁄⁄
(8.65) (21.24) (14.23) (8.53) (22.31) (13.63)
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included
J. Byrne, T. O’Connor / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 49 (2017) 154–172 161creditor rights index is 0.051⁄⁄⁄ in medium disclosure regimes yet only 0.018⁄⁄⁄ in high disclosure environments. The differ-
ent dividend-creditor rights relationships come about because poorly-protected creditors place many (few) restrictions on
dividend payouts in intermediate (high) disclosure regimes. Shao et al. (2013) examine the dividend-creditor rights relation-
ship in strong and weak shareholder rights regimes. They show that dividend payouts are most sensitive to creditor rights
where shareholder rights are strong. Creditors accept large dividends under strong creditor and strong shareholder rights yet
restrict dividends where creditor rights are weak yet shareholder rights strong. Where shareholder rights are weak, well-
protected creditors do not mandate large dividend payouts given the norm of low dividend payouts under weak shareholder
rights. In this paper, we find that dividend payouts are much less sensitive to creditor rights in strong disclosure regimes
because creditors place fewer restrictions on dividend payouts in these regimes. The dividend-creditor rights relationship
is at its strongest in intermediate disclosure regimes.
Second, dividend payouts and creditor rights are negatively related in opaque regimes. Using the ‘‘Low creditor rights
dummy” the same patterns in dividends payouts emerge; dividend payouts are smaller where creditor rights are weak in
medium and high disclosure regimes, yet larger in opaque regimes.13
In Fig. 2 (see Panel B) we depict the predicted relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights in each disclosure
regime using the estimated coefficient estimates in Table 3. The independent variables are evaluated at their sample means
and the fixed effects evaluated for industrial firms in the year 2005. Our findings possess economic as well as statistical sig-
nificance. In opaque regimes average dividends-to-earnings is 22.9% under weak creditor rights and 17.7% where creditor
rights are strong. In transparent disclosure regimes poorly-protected creditors place fewer restrictions on dividend payouts;
using dividends-to-earnings, the difference in dividend payouts is zero. In medium disclosure regimes, poorly-protected
creditors place the largest restrictions on dividend payout; average dividends-to-cash flow is 19.5% under strong creditor
rights, yet only 8.7% under weak creditor rights, which suggests a 2.24-fold (i.e., 19.5/8.7) increase in dividend payouts when
creditor rights changes from weak to strong. Using dividends-to-sales, Brockman and Unlu (2009) find that dividends are13 Shao et al. (2013) find that the dividend payout - creditor rights relationship is much less pronounced and sometimes negative under weak shareholder
rights.
Fig. 2. Predicted dividend payout by disclosure standard and strength of creditor rights.
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J. Byrne, T. O’Connor / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 49 (2017) 154–172 1631.82 times larger under strong creditor rights compared to weak creditor rights (i.e., 1.64/0.90).14 Our findings say that div-
idend payouts are most sensitive to creditor rights in intermediate disclosure regimes.
Finally, across disclosure regimes, the firm- and country-level determinants of corporate dividend payouts are almost
always signed ‘‘correctly” and consistently signed the same. Using dividends-to-cash flow, size, growth, leverage, profitabil-
ity, and growth opportunities are signed the same in each disclosure regime. However, their economic significance differs
across regimes; dividend payouts are most sensitive to size in high disclosure regimes, yet most sensitive to growth, lever-
age, and profitability in opaque regimes. In medium disclosure regimes, dividend payouts are less sensitive to measures of
growth, leverage, profitability, growth opportunities, and the dividend premium, when compared to dividend payouts in the
other two disclosure regimes. The relationship between dividend payout and uncertainty avoidance is negative in high and
medium disclosure regimes. Finally, it is only in high disclosure regimes that the estimated coefficient estimate on the div-
idend premium variable is positive. In opaque regimes, the estimated coefficient is negative.
3.3. The ‘‘dividend payout–disclosure” relation by strength of creditor rights
In Table 4 we show that our findings in Table 3 have important implications for the dividend–disclosure relationship.
Here we estimate Eq. (1) but now by strength of creditor rights. The dividend-disclosure relation is ‘‘u-shaped”, but only
where creditor rights are weak. Using dividends-to-cash flow the coefficient estimate for ‘‘Medium disclosure” is negative
(0.103⁄⁄⁄), and effectively zero for the ‘‘High disclosure” regime. The ‘‘u-shaped” dividend-disclosure relationship says that
the outcome and substitution models are not mutually-exclusive; the substitution model is evident in opaque regimes, the
outcome model manifests in transparent disclosure regimes. So too does the dividend-disclosure relationship under strong
creditor rights. Where creditor rights are strong the dividend payout-disclosure relationship is positive; the coefficient esti-
mates on the medium and high disclosure dummies are positive, larger in the high disclosure regime, and always statistically
significant. Dividend payouts increase monotonically with disclosure quality. The positive dividend-disclosure relationship,
which is evidence in support of the ‘‘outcome” model, does not automatically rule against the ‘‘substitution” model. Rather, it
says that dividend payouts are an ‘‘outcome” of disclosure standards; dividend payouts increase as disclosure standards
improve, yet dividend payouts remain sufficiently large in opaque regimes so that firms can use dividend payouts to build
reputation capital. Under strong and weak creditor rights, dividend payouts are always larger in transparent regimes. The
‘‘outcome” and ‘‘substitution” models are not mutually-exclusive, and the collective findings from Tables 3 and 4 say that
both models hold regardless of the strength of creditor rights. Shao et al. (2013) show that the dividend-creditor rights rela-
tionship is positive, and negative under weak shareholder rights. Our findings are consistent with theirs if firms in weak
shareholder rights regimes use dividend payouts to build trust with outside investors.
In Fig. 2 (see Panel A) we outline the predicted relationship between dividend payout and disclosure by strength of cred-
itor rights as implied by the estimated coefficients in Table 4. It is clear from Fig. 2 that the relationship between dividend
payouts and disclosure standards is ‘‘u-shaped” under weak creditor rights alone, yet positive under strong creditor rights. In
intermediate disclosure regimes, dividend payouts under strong creditor rights are more than double dividends paid under
weak creditor rights (i.e., compare 19.8% under strong creditor rights to 8.7% under weak creditor rights). In opaque disclo-
sure regimes firms’ pay out on average 26% more of their cash flow (compare 0.096 under strong creditor rights to 0.121
under weak creditor rights) in the form of a dividend under weak creditor rights when compared to similar firms in countries
where creditor rights are strong. In transparent regimes, dividend payouts are not very different under strong and weak
creditor rights.
Byrne and O’Connor (2012) and Shao et al. (2013) test the shareholder rights version of the outcome model under strong
and weak creditor rights. Both find that poorly-protected creditors place restrictions on dividend payouts even where share-
holder rights are strong. In this paper we find that dividend payouts are lower in transparent regimes under weak creditor
rights, yet the extent of dividend restrictions is much lower in transparent regimes under weak creditor rights than they are
where shareholder rights are strong. Our findings say that disclosure standards, and not shareholder rights, serve to mod-
erate the dividend-creditor rights relationship.
In summary Tables 3 and 4 together say that; the substitution model of dividends holds under strong and weak creditor
rights; poorly-protected creditors place few restrictions on dividend payouts in transparent regimes; yet place much larger
restrictions on dividend payouts in intermediate disclosure regimes. The ‘‘u-shaped” dividend-disclosure relationship uncov-
ered by Brockman and Unlu (2011) is evident only under weak creditor rights. Otherwise, the relationship is positive.
In Table 5 we turn our attention towards the propensity to pay a dividend by presenting a series of marginal effects from
pooled logit regressions. The dependent variable is a binary indicator which is 1 if the firm pays a dividend in a given year
and zero otherwise. When we use dividend payer instead of the dividend amount ratios, we still conclude the same as we did
in Tables 3 and 4. The relationship between the likelihood of paying a dividend and disclosure remains ‘‘u-shaped” under
weak creditor rights, yet mostly positive under strong creditor rights. The relation between the dividend payer and creditor
rights is positive in intermediate disclosure regimes, negative in opaque regimes, and effectively zero in transparent regimes.
Interestingly, using dividend payer, dividend payout is now most sensitive to creditor rights in opaque regimes.14 Brockman and Unlu (2009) present the predicted dividend-to-sales ratio by creditor rights score. The average of the predicted dividend-to-sales in weak
creditor rights regimes is 0.90% (an average of 0.78% (where CR is 1) and 1.02% (where CR is 2)) and 1.64% where creditor rights are strong (1.31% (CR is 3), 1.63%
(CR is 4), and 1.98% where CR is 5).
Table 4
Dividend payout and disclosure quality by strength of creditor rights. This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares regressions
with t-stats adjusted for clustering at the firm level presented underneath in parenthesis. Separate regressions are estimated by level of creditor rights. Firms
belong in high (low) creditor rights regimes if their country level score is above (below and equal to) the country sample median, which is 2. Creditor rights are
an index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta et al. (2000), and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). Creditor rights data is
sourced from Djankov et al. (2007). The sample period is 1996–2007. The dependent variable is either dividends-to-cash flow or dividends-to-earnings, as
indicated. Disclosure is a country-level accounting disclosure score assigned by Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). It ranges from
0 to 100, where higher values correspond to more disclosures. Uncertainty Avoidance is a country-level culture measure from Hofstede (2001). In the top panel,
‘‘Disclosure” and ‘‘Disclosure2” are included in each regression. In the bottom panel, we create separate dummy variables for each disclosure regime, namely,
low, medium, and high disclosure. The reference group is the low disclosure regime. All other variables are defined in the main text and summarized in
Appendix A. A full set of year and industry fixed effects are included but not reported, and ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄, and ⁄ denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Dependent variable is
Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends-to-earnings
Strength of creditor rights (CR)
High CR Low CR High CR Low CR
Disclosure 0.085⁄⁄⁄ 0.111⁄⁄⁄ 0.068⁄⁄⁄ 0.150⁄⁄⁄
(8.78) (14.42) (4.83) (13.07)
Disclosure2 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.004⁄⁄⁄ 0.001⁄⁄⁄
(8.45) (14.22) (4.47) (12.95)
Size 0.026⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.041⁄⁄⁄ 0.021⁄⁄⁄
(23.96) (17.51) (29.25) (25.83)
Growth 0.020⁄⁄⁄ 0.018⁄⁄⁄ 0.019⁄⁄⁄ 0.026⁄⁄⁄
(9.72) (16.08) (6.95) (16.46)
Leverage 0.138⁄⁄⁄ 0.069⁄⁄⁄ 0.158⁄⁄⁄ 0.079⁄⁄⁄
(20.04) (25.36) (16.73) (17.88)
Profitability 0.088⁄⁄⁄ 0.013⁄⁄⁄ 0.111⁄⁄⁄ 0.001
(17.95) (8.89) (17.55) (0.59)
Tobin’s q 0.020⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.015⁄⁄⁄ 0.003⁄⁄
(10.75) (6.61) (6.52) (2.21)
Uncertainty avoidance 0.001 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.003⁄⁄⁄
(0.32) (22.16) (3.06) (33.88)
Dividend premium 0.052⁄⁄⁄ 0.028⁄⁄⁄ 0.086⁄⁄⁄ 0.051⁄⁄⁄
(4.61) (3.47) (5.50) (4.10)
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included
# firm-year observations 39,194 85,655 39,194 85,655
R-squared 0.187 0.149 0.180 0.206
Medium disclosure dummy 0.105⁄⁄⁄ 0.103⁄⁄⁄ 0.099⁄⁄⁄ 0.162⁄⁄⁄
(10.38) (18.30) (7.22) (20.40)
High disclosure dummy 0.122⁄⁄⁄ 0.001 0.145⁄⁄⁄ 0.010
(13.83) (0.10) (11.64) (1.50)
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included
Controls Included Included Included Included
Average div payout in low disclosure 0.09 0.12 0.19 0.25
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with low dividends to a much greater extent in intermediate disclosure regimes. In transparent disclosure regimes dividend
payouts are not always lower given weak creditor rights. In turn, this latter finding highlights a second distinct substitution
effect; rich disclosures appear to moderate the dividend–creditor rights relationship. Rich disclosures reduce the agency
costs of debt which further appears to reduce the need for creditors to restrict dividends given weak creditor rights. In this
regard, disclosure quality appears to substitute for poor creditor rights. Finally, in opaque regimes large dividend payouts
appear to substitute for weak creditor rights and/or weak disclosure. We posit that this substitution effect is practiced by
firms and creditors alike. Firms are financially-constrained in opaque regimes, and pay large dividends to relax these con-
straints by building trust with investors (see Gan et al., 2014). Our findings also suggest that creditors do not restrict large
dividend payouts which suggest that reputation building may be effective in building trust with creditors. For whatever rea-
son(s), creditors do not appear to restrict large dividends in opaque regimes.
In the next section, we study the behaviour of firms and creditors alike in opaque regimes in more detail. If poorly-
protected creditors exhibit a preference for large dividends in opaque regimes, then dividends should remain large and unre-
stricted in growth and mature firms alike. An alternative view is that creditors restrict large dividends in mature firms who
have little need to use large dividend payouts to build trust, yet continue to allow growth firms to pay large dividends. Also,
we try to uncover the motivations for firms in opaque regimes to pay even larger dividends where creditor rights are weak.
We believe that these firms are most financially constrained of all firms in our sample and the large dividends that they pay
are commensurate with the severity of the financing constraints that they face.
Table 5
Dividend payer regressions. This table reports marginal effects from pooled fixed-effect logit regressions. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample mean
of each variable. Separate regressions are estimated by level of creditor rights and disclosure, as indicated. Firms belong in high (low) creditor rights regimes if
their country level score is above (below or equal to) the country sample median, which is 2. Creditor rights are an index aggregating creditor rights, following
La Porta et al. (2000), and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). ‘‘Low creditor rights dummy” is a dummy variable which is one if
creditor rights are less than the sample median (2) and zero otherwise. Creditor rights data is sourced from Djankov et al. (2007). Disclosure is a country-level
accounting disclosure score assigned by Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). It ranges from 0 to 100, where higher values
correspond to more disclosures. In the bottom panel, we create separate dummy variables for each disclosure regime, namely, low, medium, and high
disclosure. The reference group is the low disclosure regime. All other variables are defined in the main text and summarized in Appendix A. The sample period
is 1996–2007. A full set of year and industry fixed effects are included but not reported, and ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄, and ⁄ denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Creditor rights (CR) Disclosure levels
High CR Low CR High Medium Low
Disclosure 0.043⁄ 0.205⁄⁄⁄
(1.67) (8.77)
Disclosure2 0.002 0.001⁄⁄⁄
(1.42) (8.76)
Creditor rights 0.005 0.011⁄⁄⁄ 0.149⁄⁄⁄
(0.76) (12.19) (17.45)
Size 0.106⁄⁄⁄ 0.050⁄⁄⁄ 0.105⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.100⁄⁄⁄
(22.68) (25.41) (19.15) (13.26) (24.01)
Growth 0.017⁄ 0.053⁄⁄⁄ 0.001 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.002
(1.91) (9.90) (0.14) (9.57) (0.11)
Leverage 0.536⁄⁄⁄ 0.261⁄⁄⁄ 0.418⁄⁄⁄ 0.022⁄⁄⁄ 0.802⁄⁄⁄
(17.50) (19.31) (11.51) (8.75) (30.58)
Profitability 3.493⁄⁄⁄ 1.283⁄⁄⁄ 3.760⁄⁄⁄ 0.146⁄⁄⁄ 3.875⁄⁄⁄
(59.88) (51.12) (55.98) (16.33) (29.99)
Tobin’s q 0.113⁄⁄⁄ 0.055⁄⁄⁄ 0.113⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.112⁄⁄⁄
(19.39) (25.35) (19.17) (12.49) (14.39)
Uncertainty avoidance 0.001 0.005⁄⁄⁄ 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.004⁄⁄⁄
(1.14) (25.81) (3.66) (6.53) (7.01)
Dividend premium 0.111⁄⁄⁄ 0.038 0.048 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.392⁄⁄⁄
(3.51) (1.62) (1.07) (3.22) (11.50)
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included
R-squared 0.439 0.429 0.476 0.408 0.362
Medium disclosure dummy 0.036 0.273⁄⁄⁄
(1.56) (21.08)
High disclosure dummy 0.082⁄⁄⁄ 0.034⁄⁄⁄
(3.82) (7.34)
Low creditor rights dummy 0.024 0.117⁄⁄⁄ 0.277⁄⁄⁄
(1.33) (9.32) (17.80)
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Controls Included Included Included Included Included
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In Table 6 we present the average dividend payout for firms classified by growth opportunities in each disclosure regime.
Growth opportunities are captured using the previous three years market-to-book of assets. We classify firms into growth
deciles, where decile one contains firms with the least growth opportunities (e.g., mature firms) and decile ten contains firms
with abundant growth opportunities (i.e., growth firms). It is clear that in opaque regimes poorly-protected creditors do not
restrict dividend payouts in mature firms. Rather, dividend payouts are always larger all across the growth spectrum where
creditor rights weak when compared to dividend payouts in the same disclosure regime where creditor rights are strong.15
The fact that we observe that both growth and mature firms pay large dividends in opaque regimes lends support to the view
that creditors view large dividend payouts as beneficial to their own interests. There does not appear to be any other reason to
allow mature firms to pay large dividends given weak creditor rights, since it is unlikely that these firms are paying large div-
idends to build trust with investors in the first instance.
Next we examine whether the large dividend payouts that we observe in opaque regimes reflect the severity of the
financing constraints that these firms likely face. A priori, constrained firms are the most-likely firms to use dividends to
build ‘‘reputation capital”, especially if other bonding mechanisms, say improved governance, may be too expensive for these
firms to implement in the first instance (see Doidge et al., 2007). Also, dividends paid may increase with the severity of
financing constraints, which may explain why dividend payouts are largest in opaque regimes where creditor rights are15 In intermediate and transparent disclosure regimes the opposite is the case, as across the growth spectrum dividend payouts are always lower where
creditor rights are weak.
Table 6
Financing, creditor rights and disclosure standards. This table outlines the average dividend payout for firms sorted by growth in countries with different levels
of disclosure and creditor rights (Panel A), and average book debt, long-term debt to assets, and equity to long-term capital for firms in the each disclosure
regime (Panels B and C). Market-to-book (M/B) decile is rank decile for market-to-book of assets over the past 3 years. Disclosure is a country-level accounting
disclosure score assigned by Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). Firms belong in high (low) creditor rights regimes if their country
level score is above (below and equal to) the country sample median, which is 2. Creditor rights are an index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta et al.
(2000), and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). Dividend payout is dividends-to-cash flow. ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄, and ⁄ signifies that the
differences in mean dividend payouts are statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Dividend payouts (dividends-to-cash flow) by growth decile in each disclosure regime
Dividend payout is dividends-to-cash flow
Low disclosure Medium disclosure High disclosure
M/B decile High CR Low CR Difference High CR Low CR Difference High CR Low CR Difference
1 0.08 0.11 (0.04)⁄⁄⁄ 0.16 0.03 0.13⁄⁄⁄ 0.15 0.10 0.04⁄⁄⁄
2 0.08 0.12 (0.05)⁄⁄⁄ 0.14 0.06 0.08⁄⁄⁄ 0.14 0.13 0.02⁄⁄⁄
3 0.09 0.13 (0.04)⁄⁄⁄ 0.14 0.07 0.07⁄⁄⁄ 0.16 0.12 0.04⁄⁄⁄
4 0.10 0.13 (0.02)⁄⁄⁄ 0.15 0.06 0.09⁄⁄⁄ 0.17 0.13 0.05⁄⁄⁄
5 0.11 0.13 (0.02)⁄⁄⁄ 0.16 0.05 0.10⁄⁄⁄ 0.17 0.13 0.04⁄⁄⁄
6 0.12 0.13 (0.01)⁄⁄⁄ 0.15 0.05 0.10⁄⁄⁄ 0.17 0.15 0.02⁄⁄⁄
7 0.12 0.14 (0.02)⁄⁄⁄ 0.16 0.04 0.11⁄⁄⁄ 0.18 0.15 0.03⁄⁄⁄
8 0.14 0.15 (0.01)⁄⁄⁄ 0.18 0.04 0.14⁄⁄⁄ 0.17 0.16 0.01⁄⁄⁄
9 0.13 0.16 (0.03)⁄⁄⁄ 0.17 0.04 0.13⁄⁄⁄ 0.16 0.18 (0.02)⁄⁄⁄
10 0.15 0.18 (0.04)⁄⁄⁄ 0.25 0.03 0.22⁄⁄⁄ 0.18 0.19 (0.01)
Panel B: Financing in low disclosure regimes
Book debt Long-term debt to assets Equity to long-term capital
M/B decile High CR Low CR Difference High CR Low CR Difference High CR Low CR Difference
1 0.30 0.28 0.02⁄⁄⁄ 0.13 0.12 0.01⁄ 0.74 0.75 (0.01)
2 0.28 0.26 0.02⁄⁄ 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.75 0.76 (0.01)
3 0.24 0.26 (0.02)⁄ 0.11 0.12 (0.01) 0.76 0.77 (0.01)
4 0.22 0.25 (0.03)⁄⁄⁄ 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.77 0.78 (0.01)
5 0.22 0.24 (0.02)⁄⁄⁄ 0.11 0.12 (0.01) 0.77 0.78 (0.01)
6 0.21 0.23 (0.02)⁄⁄⁄ 0.11 0.12 (0.01) 0.77 0.78 (0.01)
7 0.20 0.24 (0.04)⁄⁄⁄ 0.11 0.13 (0.02)⁄⁄⁄ 0.79 0.77 0.02
8 0.19 0.23 (0.04)⁄⁄ 0.10 0.13 (0.03) 0.78 0.78 0.00
9 0.17 0.22 (0.05)⁄⁄ 0.09 0.12 (0.03) 0.80 0.80 0.00
10 0.17 0.20 (0.03) 0.08 0.10 (0.02) 0.85 0.84 0.01
Panel C: Financing in low, medium and high disclosure regimes
Book debt Long-term debt to assets Equity to long-term capital
High CR Low CR High CR Low CR High CR Low CR
Low disclosure
High growth 0.20 0.23 0.11 0.12 0.78 0.78
Low growth 0.26 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.76 0.77
Medium disclosure
High growth 0.23 0.26 0.11 0.17 0.83 0.76
Low growth 0.22 0.27 0.10 0.20 0.84 0.70
High disclosure
High growth 0.19 0.21 0.12 0.14 0.83 0.77
Low growth 0.23 0.23 0.11 0.14 0.83 0.73
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by estimating leverage-creditor rights regressions in each disclosure regime. Where disclosure standards and creditor rights
are weak, one might expect that firms’ use of debt and equity capital be constrained. Our second approach is to quantify the
severity of financing constraints at the firm-level in each disclosure regime using the ‘‘constrained” growth rates of
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).
In Table 7 we estimate a series of leverage-creditor rights regressions in each disclosure regime. Cho et al. (2014) estimate
leverage–creditor rights regressions and find in favour of the demand-side view i.e., strong creditor rights has a negative
effect on firms’ use of debt finance. Where creditor rights are (too) strong, firms voluntarily choose to use more equity,
and less debt, so that control can be maintained in times of financial distress. Presumably, this substitution away from debt
to equity financing is made possible where the cost of equity financing is not prohibitively high. The opposite view, the
supply-side view, says that the leverage-creditor rights relationship is positive. Firms benefit from cheap debt capital where
creditor rights are strong, but must pay more for debt financing where creditor rights are weak. We estimate separate
leverage-creditor rights regressions in each disclosure regime, using book debt (total debt to book assets), long-term debt
to assets, and equity to long-term capital (where long-term capital is the sum of equity and long-term debt), as our
Table 7
The leverage-creditor rights relationship in each disclosure regime. The table reports coefficient estimates from pooled least squares regressions with t-stats
adjusted for firm-level clustering presented underneath in parentheses. Separate regressions are estimated by level of disclosure quality. Disclosure is a
country-level accounting disclosure score assigned by Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The sample period is 1996–2007. The
dependent variable is either book debt, long-term debt to assets (LTD), or common equity to long-term capital (E/LTC), as indicated. Book debt is total debt to
total assets. Long term capital (LTC) is the sum of common equity and long-term debt. Creditor rights are an index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta
et al. (2000), and ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). Creditor rights data is sourced from Djankov et al. (2007). All other variables
are defined in the main text. Time and industry dummies are included, but not reported. Statistical significance is denoted by ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄, ⁄ for the 1%, 5, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Disclosure levels
High Medium Low
Book Debt LTD E/LTC Book Debt LTD E/LTC Book Debt LTD E/LTC
Creditor rights 0.010⁄⁄⁄
(5.42)
0.010⁄⁄⁄
(6.45)
0.021⁄⁄⁄
(10.05)
0.010⁄⁄
(2.55)
0.026⁄⁄⁄
(16.99)
0.035⁄⁄⁄
(17.86)
0.011⁄⁄⁄
(4.16)
0.011⁄⁄⁄
(7.31)
0.022⁄⁄⁄
(7.24)
CR range 0–4 1–4 0–3
Ind dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
# Observations 30,595 30,595 30,595 50,573 50,573 50,573 43,681 43,681 43,681
R-squared 0.107 0.151 0.192 0.183 0.111 0.169 0.171 0.183 0.171
Predicted leverage by strength of creditor rights
Lowest CR 0.228 0.136 0.746 0.250 0.180 0.747 0.207 0.103 0.809
Highest CR 0.198 0.118 0.824 0.215 0.095 0.844 0.255 0.129 0.757
J. Byrne, T. O’Connor / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 49 (2017) 154–172 167leverage/financing variables of choice. Interestingly, we find in favour of the demand-side view in medium and high disclo-
sure regimes, yet the supply-side view prevails in low disclosure regimes. The estimated coefficients on the debt and long-
term debt variables are negative in medium and high disclosure regimes, yet positive in low disclosure regimes. In medium
and high disclosure regimes, as creditor rights improve, equity as proportion of long-term capital increases, as firms substi-
tute away from risky debt financing towards safe equity financing. We argue that in medium and high disclosure regimes,
substituting debt for equity is feasible, since disclosure levels are sufficiently large enough so that the cost of equity capital is
not prohibitively high making equity a viable alternative to debt financing. In low disclosure regimes, as creditor rights
improve, equity as proportion of long-term capital decreases. Where disclosure quality is low, the cost of equity capital is
high, which may leave debt finance as the only viable source of capital for firms. Presumably, for many firms, substituting
debt for equity is not feasible. Thus, our leverage-creditor rights regressions suggest that in opaque regimes, firms rely
mostly on short-term debt financing where creditor rights are weak, and debt finance predominantly (short- and long-
term debt), where creditor rights are strong. Reputation building would appear to be practiced by firms in opaque regimes
so that they can attain better access to long-term funding (long-term debt and equity).16
In Table 8 we try and quantify the severity of financing constraints at the firm-level in each disclosure regime. We cal-
culate the proportion of firms in each regime whose actual growth rate exceeds their internally-financed growth rate
(IG), their short-term financed growth rate (SFG), and their maximum sustainable growth rate (SG), respectively (see
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). These three growth rates are measures of a firms ‘‘constrained growth”.
Financially-unconstrained firms can grow at a rate greater than their constrained growth rate. As expected, it is firms in opa-
que regimes where creditor rights are weak that are the most constrained of all firms in our sample since we observe that the
proportion of firms which exceed their constrained rate is lowest here. Since we know that country-level institutional factors
can partly explain firm-level financing constraints, it is plausible that a combination of weak disclosure and poor creditor
rights, contribute to firm-level financing obstacles in these regimes (see Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Beck
et al., 2006). The large dividend payouts which we observe in these regimes likely represent the attempts on the part of these
firms to overcome severe financing constraints by paying the largest dividends of all firms in opaque regimes. If this is the
case, and there is evidence to say that this bonding approach is successful, poorly-protected creditors do not restrict the
practice by firms of using large dividend payouts to build trust with outside investors.3.5. Robustness tests
In Table 9 we show that our findings are robust to a number of additional tests. Panel A says that our findings are robust to
the use of dividends-to-assets and dividends-to-sales in place of dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-earnings, and16 In the remaining rows of Table 7 we report the average financing ratios for growth and mature firms in each disclosure regime. These summary measures
would appear to suggest that reputation building is effective, in that growth firms in opaque regimes use roughly the same amount of long-term financing (debt
and equity) when compared to firms in medium and high disclosure regimes. Also, in opaque regimes, growth firms where creditor rights are weak use more
long-term debt (although the differences are not statistically significant), and the same amount of equity to long-term capital compared to the same firms
where creditor rights are strong. Firms have better access to equity financing as a result of reputation building using large dividend payouts (see Gan et al.,
2014).
Table 8
Disclosure levels, creditor rights and the proportion of firms which exceed their constrained growth rates. This table presents the proportion of firms whose
actual growth rate exceeds their constrained growth rate. Actual growth is measured as one-year annual sales growth. We use three constrained growth rates
from Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), namely IG, SFG, and SG. IG is the maximum growth that a firm can achieve if it relies on internal funds alone and
maintains it dividend. SFG is the maximum growth rate that a firm can attain by using both internal cash-flows and short-term debt. SG is the maximum
growth rate achievable using internal funds, short and long-term debt to maintain a constant book leverage ratio (i.e. total debt to assets). Low (Medium)
disclosure ranges from 58 to 71 (72 to 76). High disclosure corresponds to disclosure values between 78 and 85. Firms belong in high (low) creditor rights
regimes if their country level score is above (below and equal to) the country sample median, which is 2. Disclosure is from CIFAR (1995), and creditor rights
from Djankov et al. (2007).
Constrained growth rates
Internally-financed growth
rate (IG)
Short-term financed growth
rate (SFG)
Maximum attainable growth
rate (SG)
Proportion of firms which
exceed their internally-
financed growth rate (IG)
Proportion of firms which
exceed their short-term
financed growth rate (SFG)
Proportion of firms which
exceed their maximum
attainable growth rate (SG)
Disclosure: High CR Low CR High CR Low CR High CR Low CR
Low 0.54 0.50 0.46 0.40 0.44 0.38
Medium 0.55 0.57 0.47 0.56 0.39 0.45
High 0.60 0.57 0.50 0.47 0.43 0.42
Table 9
Robustness tests. This table reports coefficient estimates from a series of robustness tests. Panel A reports the coefficient estimates from a series of pooled
ordinary least squares estimates using dividends-to-assets and dividends-to-sales, as indicated. In Panel B we account for the censored nature of the dependent
variable by estimating a series of tobit regressions. In all regressions, dividends to cash flow are used to measure dividend payout. In Panel C we include a
number of additional country-level variables in a series of pooled ordinary least squares regressions. Panel D excludes firms from Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. In
all dividends to cash flow is used to measure dividend payout. Dividend tax advantage is the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in dividends divided by the
after-tax value of one dollar paid out in capital gains and are values corresponding to the year 2001. Dividend tax advantage is sourced from Bartram et al.
(2012) and Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010). The (Revised) anti-director rights index is an index capturing the strength of shareholder rights. The index is sourced
from Djankov et al. (2007). Stock market development is calculated in each year from 1996 to 2007 as stock market capitalization to GDP. This data is sourced
from an updated version of Beck et al. (2001). Labor rights are from Botero et al. (2004) and capture the strength of labor (employment) rights in each country. A
full set of year and industry fixed effects are included but not reported, and ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄, and ⁄ denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Coefficient estimates for
creditor rights variable in
various disclosure regimes
Coefficient estimates for ‘‘low
creditor rights dummy” in
various disclosure regimes
Coefficient
estimates for
‘‘medium disclosure
dummy” in high and
low creditor rights
regimes
Coefficient
estimates for ‘‘high
disclosure dummy”
in high and low
creditor rights
regimes
Disclosure levels Creditor rights (CR)
High Medium Low High Medium Low High CR Low CR High CR Low CR
Panel A: Alternative dividend payout variables
Dividends-to-assets 0.0002 0.005⁄⁄⁄ 0.0002 0.006⁄⁄⁄ 0.014⁄⁄⁄ 0.002⁄⁄⁄ 0.009⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.001⁄⁄
Dividends-to-sales 0.002⁄⁄⁄ 0.005⁄⁄⁄ 0.002⁄⁄ 0.007⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.003⁄⁄⁄ 0.008⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.001
Panel B: Censored dependent variable estimation
Tobit estimation using
dividends-to-cash flow
0.016⁄⁄⁄ 0.124⁄⁄⁄ 0.040⁄⁄⁄ 0.055⁄⁄⁄ 0.342⁄⁄⁄ 0.081⁄⁄⁄ 0.112⁄⁄⁄ 0.221⁄⁄⁄ 0.148⁄⁄⁄ 0.003
Panel C: Additional controls using dividends-to-cash flow
Dividend tax advantage 0.018⁄⁄⁄ 0.051⁄⁄⁄ 0.018⁄⁄⁄ 0.059⁄⁄⁄ 0.145⁄⁄⁄ 0.044⁄⁄⁄ 0.106⁄⁄⁄ 0.101⁄⁄⁄ 0.124⁄⁄⁄ 0.004
(Revised) anti-director rights
index
0.033⁄⁄⁄ 0.051⁄⁄⁄ 0.019⁄⁄⁄ 0.119⁄⁄⁄ 0.124⁄⁄⁄ 0.046⁄⁄⁄ 0.099⁄⁄⁄ 0.088⁄⁄⁄ 0.121⁄⁄⁄ 0.012⁄⁄
Stock market development 0.018⁄⁄⁄ 0.053⁄⁄⁄ 0.017⁄⁄⁄ 0.057⁄⁄⁄ 0.135⁄⁄⁄ 0.044⁄⁄⁄ 0.090⁄⁄⁄ 0.094⁄⁄⁄ 0.122⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄
Labor rights 0.028⁄⁄⁄ 0.047⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.107⁄⁄⁄ 0.143⁄⁄⁄ 0.042⁄⁄⁄ 0.102⁄⁄⁄ 0.108⁄⁄⁄ 0.118⁄⁄⁄ 0.047⁄⁄⁄
Panel D: Excl. firms from Japan, the U.K., and the U.S
Coefficient estimate using
dividends-to-cash flow
0.037⁄⁄ 0.044⁄⁄⁄ 0.019⁄⁄⁄ 0.074⁄⁄⁄ 0.116⁄⁄⁄ 0.051⁄⁄⁄ 0.098⁄⁄⁄ 0.090⁄⁄⁄ 0.126⁄⁄⁄ 0.019⁄⁄⁄
Coefficient estimate using
dividends-to-earnings
0.049⁄⁄⁄ 0.057⁄⁄⁄ 0.014⁄⁄⁄ 0.091⁄⁄⁄ 0.163⁄⁄⁄ 0.059⁄⁄⁄ 0.092⁄⁄⁄ 0.130⁄⁄⁄ 0.147⁄⁄⁄ 0.020⁄⁄
Coefficient estimate using
dividend payer
0.011 0.074⁄⁄⁄ 0.045⁄⁄⁄ 0.030 0.236⁄⁄⁄ 0.031 0.042 0.256⁄⁄⁄ 0.109⁄⁄⁄ 0.070⁄⁄⁄
168 J. Byrne, T. O’Connor / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 49 (2017) 154–172dividend-payer to measure corporate dividend payouts. In Panel B, we present coefficient estimates from a series of Tobit
regressions which accounts for the censored nature of our dividend payout variable.17 Accounting for the censored nature17 In a series of unreported regressions, we show that our Tobit regressions are robust to the use of dividends-to-earnings, dividends-to-sales and dividends-
to-assets as the payout measure.
J. Byrne, T. O’Connor / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 49 (2017) 154–172 169of corporate dividend payout fails to materially affect our main conclusions. Next, a potential criticism is that our findings are
biased because of omitted country-level variables, which are correlated with creditor rights, disclosure, and dividend payouts. In
Panel C we include a number of additional country-level determinants of dividend payouts. These measures are dividend tax
advantage, the revised anti-director rights index, stock market development, and labor rights. We find that our conclusions
remain unaltered when we include these additional variables either individually in turn, or collectively. In Panel D we exclude
all firms from Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. Collectively these countries contribute more than half (53.66%) of the total number of
firms in our sample. A potential concern then is that our findings are driven by the inclusion of firms from these countries. By
and large, they are not.18 However, when we exclude firms from the U.K., dividends paid under weak creditor rights in trans-
parent regimes are now lower.4. Concluding remarks
In the beginning of this paper we pose three questions. To answer each of these questions we observe the actions of
poorly-protected creditors in various disclosure regimes. First, we examine whether creditors restrict the practice by firms
in opaque regimes of using large dividend payouts to build reputation capital? Second, are the low dividend payouts which
we observe in intermediate disclosure regimes the result of creditors in Canada and the U.S., two countries where creditor
rights are weak, placing large restrictions on dividend payouts? And finally, we explore whether creditors continue to restrict
dividend payouts in transparent regimes where disclosures are abundant, and agency costs of debt low? We are able to
answer these three questions by showing that the extent to which creditors influence corporate dividend policy is influenced
by the quality of the disclosure environment.
Using a sample of 124,849 firm-years from 28 countries we show that the dividend-creditor rights relationship is strongly
influenced by disclosure standards and the dividend-disclosure relationship by the strength of creditor rights. A priori, if
creditors place many (few) restrictions on corporate dividend payouts, then dividend payouts will be sensitive (less sensi-
tive) to creditor rights resulting in a ‘‘strong” (‘‘weak”) dividend-creditor rights relationship. The dividend-creditor rights
relationship is positive in medium and high transparency regimes. The relationship is stronger in the former regime, as it
is here where creditors place the largest restrictions on corporate dividend payouts. The low dividends that Brockman
and Unlu (2011) observe in intermediate disclosure regimes is a direct result of poorly-protected creditors in Canada and
the United States placing large restrictions on dividend payouts We observe that dividend payouts are much larger in inter-
mediate disclosure regimes where creditor rights are strong.
In high disclosure regimes, poorly-protected creditors place fewer restrictions on dividend payout. In effect they appear to
view weak creditor rights (and the associated high agency costs of debt) and a healthy disclosure environment (and its asso-
ciated low agency costs of debt) as substitutes for one another. Finally we show that the dividend-creditor rights relationship
is negative in opaque regimes. Rather than restrict dividends in opaque regimes, dividend payouts remain large irrespective
of the strength of creditor rights. We do not know whether large dividends in opaque regimes are (a) accepted by poorly-
protected creditors because trust has been built between them and the firm and/or (b) demanded by creditors to compensate
for weak disclosure (and weak creditor rights). Whatever the reason(s), firms can use large dividends to build trust with out-
side investors in opaque regimes even where creditor rights are weak.
Our findings also have important implications for the dividend-disclosure relationship. The agency models of dividends
offer two alternative dividend-disclosure relationships. The first model, the ‘‘outcome” model, says that dividend payout
increases with disclosure quality. The second model, the ‘‘substitution” model, says that dividend payout decreases with dis-
closure quality. However, Brockman and Unlu (2011) show that the outcome and substitution models are not mutually-
exclusive, and a finding in favour of one does not automatically rule against the other. They proceed to show that the actual
dividend-disclosure relationship is neither positive nor negative, but ‘‘u-shaped”. We show that the nature of the dividend-
disclosure relationship is influenced by the strength of creditor rights. It is only under weak creditor rights that we observe a
‘‘u-shaped” dividend payout-disclosure relationship. In contrast, where creditor rights are strong the dividend-disclosure
relationship is positive; dividend payouts increase monotonically with disclosure quality. However, and like Brockman
and Unlu (2011), we do move in favour of the ‘‘outcome” model and against the ‘‘substitution” model. Rather, our findings
say that dividends remain large in opaque regimes (the substitution model), yet larger in intermediate (the outcome model)
and strong disclosure environments (also the outcome model) where strongly-protected creditors place few restrictions on
dividend payouts. Dividend payouts are always the largest in transparent regimes, yet are sufficiently large enough in opa-
que regimes to allow firms to use dividend payouts to build trust with outside investors. The outcome and substitution mod-
els are not mutually exclusive and prevail under strong and weak creditor rights.18 Using dividends-to-earnings for the reduced sample under strong creditor rights the disclosure coefficient is negative (0.125⁄⁄⁄) and the disclosure
squared term is positive (0.001⁄⁄⁄) indicating a u-shaped relationship between dividend payout and disclosure standards. However, a u-shaped relationship
between dividend payouts and disclosure standards is not evidence against our hypotheses per se as the u-shaped relation which we observe here is much less
pronounced as is the case where creditor rights are weak as dividend payouts in intermediate disclosure regimes remain large. Specifically, the predicted
dividends-to-earnings by disclosure standards are as follows: where disclosure is 62 the predicted dividends to earnings ratio is 25%. The predicted payouts for
the remaining disclosure levels are: 67 (payout is 21%), 68 (18%), 73 (18%), 74 (27%), 75 (23%), 79 (25%), and 80 (26%). For our reduced sample, dividend payouts
remain large in all three disclosure regimes. In intermediate disclosure regimes dividend payouts are much smaller under weak creditor rights. When we
replace disclosure and its square with the disclosure dummies the ‘‘dividend payout-disclosure” relation is positive.
170 J. Byrne, T. O’Connor / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 49 (2017) 154–172Our analysis highlight a number of issues which we believe are worthy of future research. One of the most interesting
relates to the reputation building practices of firms in opaque regimes. Firms use more equity financing once trust has been
established with outside investors (see Gan et al., 2014). Gan et al. (2014) do not explore the debt issuing behaviour of these
firms. It would be interesting to examine whether creditors extend more long-term debt finance to reputation-building
firms. Poorly-protected creditors do not restrict the practice of reputation-building by firms, yet it is not clear if the firms
have greater access to long-term equity and debt financing once this trust has been established. We present some summary
financing measures at the bottom of Table 8 which suggests that these firms appear to have access to more long-term debt
financing. However, further work is required so that the relationship between dividend payout, reputation-building, and
debt financing in opaque disclosure regimes is better understood. Finally, in this paper we do not explore how culture
may moderate the dividend-creditor rights and dividend-disclosure relationships. Byrne and O’Connor (2017) show that cul-
ture (e.g., collectivism) moderates the dividend-creditor rights relationship; in collectivist societies, dividend payouts are
actually larger under weak creditor rights. In this paper, many collectivist countries belong in low disclosure/weak creditor
rights regimes (see Argentina, India, Japan, and Mexico for example). Therefore, it possible that culture may also help to
explain why poorly-protected creditors do not restrict dividend payouts in opaque disclosure regimes.
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Appendix A. Variable descriptionsVariable Description Source CoverageDividends-to-cash flow Dividends per share/cash flow per share Worldscope 1996–2007
Dividends-to-earnings Dividends per share/earnings per share Worldscope 1996–2007
Dividends-to-assets Total dividends to total assets Worldscope 1996–2007
Dividends-to-sales Total dividends to net sales Worldscope 1996–2007
Size Log of book assets in US$ Worldscope 1996–2007
Growth Logarithmic one-year sales growth Worldscope 1996–2007
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxation to book
assets
Worldscope 1996–2007Leverage Total debt to total assets Worldscope 1996–2007
Long-term debt to assets Long-term debt to assets Worldscope 1996–2007
Equity to long-term capital Equity to long-term capital. Long-term capital is
the sum of equity and long-term debt
Tobin’s q Tobin’s q is defined as the book value of debt
less plus market capitalization divided by the
book value of assetsWorldscope 1996–2007IG (ROA ⁄ b)/(1  (ROA ⁄ b)), where ROA is return
on assets, and b is the retention ratioWorldscope 1996–2007SG ðROE=ð1 ROEÞÞ where ROE is the return on
equityWorldscope 1996–2007SFG ðROLTC=ð1 ROLTCÞÞ where ROLTC is the ratio
of earnings after interest and tax to long-term
capital. Long-term capital is calculated as the
product of a firm’s total assets and 1 minus the
ratio of short-term liabilities to total assetsWorldscope 1996–2007Creditor rights An index aggregating creditor rights, following
La Porta et al. (2000). The index ranges from 0
(weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor
rights)Djankov et al.
(2007)We use creditor
rights data for
the year 2002Disclosure Country-level accounting disclosure score
assigned by Center for International Financial
Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The index is
created by examining and rating companies’
annual reports for their inclusion and exclusion
of 85 items and ranges from 0 to 100 with 100
as the highest standardCIFAR (1995) and
sourced from Hope
et al. (2007)1993
J. Byrne, T. O’Connor / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 49 (2017) 154–172 171Appendix A (continued)Variable Description Source CoverageUncertainty avoidance Captures the extent of uncertainty avoidance in
a societyHofstede (2001)Labour rights Employment laws index from Botero et al.
(2004). The employment laws index combines
four sub-indexes, namely (1) alternative
employment contracts, (2) cost of increasing
hours worked, (3) cost of firing workers, and (4)
dismissal proceduresBotero et al. (2004) 1997Stock market development Stock market capitalization to GDP in each year
from 1996 to 2007Updated version of
Beck et al. (2001)1996–2007Dividend tax advantage The after-tax value of one dollar paid out in
dividends divided by the after-tax value of one
dollar paid out in capital gains. Dividend tax
advantage is for 2001Bartram et al.
(2012) and Fidrmuc
and Jacob (2010)2001Shareholder rights Revised version of the original anti-director
rights index of La Porta et al. (2000)Djankov et al.
(2007)1997Dividend premium The ratio of the average market-to-book of
dividend paying firms to the average market-
to-book of non-paying firms. Dividend
Premium is calculated annually for each
countryWorldscope 1996–2007References
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